F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (threatened reprisal did not excuse witness from duty to testify about associate's gambling activities). A report by the Department ofJustice's Criminal Division has noted that:
Because discouraging witnesses with the use of violence is such an effective tool for neutralizing law enforcement, the most cruel and inhuman torture before death is not uncommon. Those suspected of cooperating with law enforcement officials have been beaten, burned, blown up, shot, drowned, and/or garrotted. The hits are typically well-planned and executed by professionals who leave few traces, and on the rare occasion where there are witnesses, as soon as the word goes out that it was a mob hit, the witnesses become very reticent ... U.S. DEPT. OF 6 The likelihood of reprisal against those who testify is uncertain. CompareJ. ALBINI, THE AMERICAN MAFIA 267-69 (1971) (a participant in organized crime will probably be killed for revealing facts which "might be legally devastating to important syndicate participants .. " Exceptions occur when social conditions, including the likelihood of a police crack-down, warrant against it) with F. IANNI Sec. 501. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to provide for the security of Government witnesses, potential Government witnesses, and the families of Government witnesses and potential witnesses in legal proceedings against any person alleged to have participated in an organized criminal activity.
Sec. 502. The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to rent, purchase, modify, or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses and persons intended to be called as Government witnesses, and the families of witnesses and persons intended to be called as Government witnesses in legal proceedings instituted against any person alleged to have participated in an organized criminal activity whenever, in his judgment, testimony from, or willingness to testify by, such a witness would place his life or person, or the life or person of a member of his family or household, in jeopardy. Any person availing himself of an offer by the Attorney General 
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Yet society has paid a heavy price for the WPP's successes. While maximizing witness security by removing witnesses from their previous lives, the program has also given witnesses a chance to escape existing civil or criminal obligations. Specifically, the WPP has enabled divorced witnesses to keep their new identities from spouses. Many witnesses consequently have violated standing custody or visitation decrees, depriving former spouses of all access to their children for several years. 1 3 Furthermore, as a rule the WPP has placed witnesses in communities across the country without alerting state and local officials to the witnesses' personal history, or even their presence. Many protected witnesses are themselves criminals, 14 and have committed new crimes after their admission to the WPP, including murder. 15 This Comment examines the accomplishments of the WPP to date and argues that the courts and the Department of Justice have struck an improper balance in weighing a witness' right to protection with the security interests of society. To an extent, an inherent tension must exist between the rights of a protected witness and the surrounding community: the anonymity that increases a witness' safety from reprisal necessarily diminishes access to a witness for law-abiding persons as well. WPP officials, however, consistently have made decisions to admit and shield witnesses without attempting to enforce child custody and visitation obligations, and without evaluating a witness' credibility or threat of harm. 16 Numerous citiorganized crime have credited the program both for saving and refocusing their lives. See 1980 Senate Hearings at 6 ("The program is super. Based on what it is designed to do, it does it well. It's designed to keep people alive and give them a new start in life, and it accomplishes this program in a damn good fashion.") (statement of anonymous witness). It is estimated that 10,000 criminals have been convicted as a result of testimony provided by federally protected witnesses. Moreover, these criminals have received sentences two times longer than those of defendants in similar cases without protected 
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zens have sued the federal government for injuries suffered at the hands of WPP witnesses;' 7 courts repeatedly have found, however, that federal decisions concerning the selection and protection of witnesses are discretionary acts for which the government cannot be liable. 18 Often, these courts have misconstrued the breadth of government discretion, and wrongly removed an important means for suing the government for its negligent acts. This Comment posits that the WPP can operate effectively without the unlimited freedom traditionally enjoyed by both administrators and witnesses. Indeed, in October 1984, Congress recognized the need to control WPP excesses by passing the first legislative reform of the program in its history. 19 Part I of this Comment examines the history and structure of the WPP, emphasizing the numerous administrative problems which have contributed to failures in protection and selection. Part II considers the suitability of the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of imposing federal liability in the WPP. Part III examines the courts' extraordinary deference to the government in the WPP, by considering cases in which federal actions have been challenged. Part IV considers the strengths and limitations of the new federal statute governing the WPP-the Witness Security Reform Act of 1984 -2 0 as a means of correcting the balance between the rights of protected witnesses and the community at large.
This Comment contends that an equitable WPP must include the mandatory assessment of a witness' risk to a community before admission to the program; must hold witnesses to all their existing civil obligations; and must impose liability on the federal government when its negligent administration of the WPP allows protected persons to commit illegal acts. These reforms would preserve society's legitimate interest in controlled access to a protected witness, without significantly damaging the governmental interest in inside information. would-be witnesses. The 1967 Task Force on Organized Crime 2 5 declared that existing provisions for protection inadequately protected witnesses from reprisal. 26 The Task Force urged Congress to create residential facilities, or "safe houses," for the protection of witnesses; witnesses desiring such protection could live at such a federal residence while the organized crime litigation was pending. 2 7 Congressional legislation addressing the Commission's proposal passed without debate in 1970.28 In addition to the "safe houses" urged by the Task Force, Title V of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act empowered the Attorney General to "otherwise provide for the health, safety, and wel-21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM REVIEW COMM. DRAFT 3, reprinted in 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 272 (findings of the Kefauver Committee).
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE WPP
22 "The assistance varied and included arranging for relocation to a new residence, assisting in establishing a new identity, or obtaining employment. Often, the assistance was little more than a bus ticket to some distant location. Ironically, two factors suggest that Congress' grant of such broad authority to the WPP was inadvertent. First, Title V was a seemingly innocuous measure, lost amidst other more controversial reforms contained in the OCCA. These other sections of the legislation received extensive debate. 1 Second, as originally drafted, the Act only permitted creation of the temporary residential facilities.3 2 The bill's sponsor acceded to a private Justice Department request to broaden the WPP's authority several months after the bill's introduction. 3 3 The Justice Department, however, did not tell Congress how this change would affect the WPP at the time of the Act's passage. As passed, Title V of the OCCA authorized the Attorney General to "rent, purchase, or construct protected housing facilities and to otherwise offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare" of witnesses. 3 5 Persons eligible for protection were those whom the government intended to call as witnesses in proceedings against persons "alleged to have participated in organized criminal activity."
'3 6 Families of witnesses also were eligible for protection. Both the offer and acceptance of protection was voluntary. The only precondition for an offer of protection was the judgment of the Attor- The Justice Department adopted few administrative procedures for the WPP in the first years after the Act's passage. 3 9 These established an admissions process for the program, 40 and described minimum background information to be required of all new entrants.
1
Such background information included general personal information about a prospective witness' name, number of family members, employment, and criminal history. It provided standards for measuring the value of a witness to the Justice Department. These standards required a description of the significance of the witness' case; a summary of the testimony; and a listing of other prospective witnesses. 42 The purpose of collecting data was to enable the Department ofJustice to decide if "it would be advantageous to the federal interest" for protection to be offerred. 43 The Justice Department 42 Requests for admission were required to contain information in 13 separate areas relating to the candidate: the witness' name, address, date and place of birth, and police record; the importance of the case, as measured by power of the illegal organization and the suspect on trial; a summary of the testimony to be provided by the witness; determination of the degree of threat posed to the witness, including the names of suspects; names, dates and places of birth, and relationship to the witness of all other persons recommended for relocation; a full listing of a witness' assets and liabilities, including real and personal property, debts, alimony, and child support orders; preliminary interviews of the witness and family; an estimate of each trial date in which the witness would be asked to appear; names of other individuals to whom protection would be offered; medical problems experienced by the witness or family; parole restrictions; employment history; and likely subsistence needs. did not address the effect of protection on other interests, including those of communities to which witnesses would be sent.
B. GROWTH AND CHANGE IN WPP DESIGN
An increase in the number of program entrants 44 forced limited structural reforms on the WPP in the first years following its creation, particularly in the provision of witness services. Three reforms are especially noteworthy: the replacement of temporary "safe houses" with permanent relocation; 4 5 creation of a protection bureaucracy to meet witness needs; 4 6 and the required preparation of a memorandum between government and witness, enumerating a new entrant's rights and duties in the WPP.
4 7 While clarifying the extent of the government's responsibility to protected witnesses, these reforms did little to enforce witnesses' responsibilities to persons outside the program.
Replacement of Safe Houses. From their inception, safehouses were criticized because they required continued monitoring and servicing, and because they had the effect of incarcerating witnesses and their families for the duration of protection. 48 Further, by exposing witnesses to each other, safehouses increased the likelihood of government probes being disclosed without authorization.
49
As an alternative to safehouses, nondescript governmentpurchased housing gradually became the preferred means by which WPP witnesses were protected. Instead of guarding witnesses to ensure their safety, WPP officials "hid" witnesses by minimizing the government's contact with them. 50 This change in policy increased witnesses' freedom of movement; at the same time, it damaged the government's ability to detect and prevent illicit witness conduct.
Creation Although laudable, the MOU suffered from a lack of enforceability. The document was neither codified nor incorporated into federal regulations. Justice officials emphasized that its terms did not constitute a contract with a witness. 62 Consequently, enforcement of the MOU required the cooperation of individual WPP agents; when they were unable or unwilling to invoke the MOU to enforce a witness' civic duties, an outside party could do little. Giuliani stressed that imposing a contractual relationship between a protected witness and the government, "whereby the witness would agree to provide testimony in return for program services and financial assistance" would be a violation of law. See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 220 (letter from Assoc. Attorney General Giuliani). The law cited by Giuliani, 18 U.S.C. § 201(h), proscribes graft and bribery among public officials, in general, and prohibits the payment or promise of anything of value "for or because of the testimony . . . to be given by [a] person as a witness . . ." in particular. 18 U.S.C. § 201(h) (1977) . Giuliani has characterized the WPP's services and payments to witnesses as being incidental to and not in exchange for witness testimony. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 220.
63 In Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1981), for example, the court found no federal liability when the government refused to provide a plaintiff with a witness' new identity, so that the plaintiff could collect a $5,000 debt. 
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had direct and indirect bearing on the WPP's ability to enforce witnesses' civic duties.
Direct Effects
Ambivalence of U.S. Marshals. A tension emerged between policymakers and implementers of the WPP, due to long-standing organizational divisions in the program's administrative office, the United States Marshals Service (USMS). Determining the services to be promised witnesses in the MOU, and other program formulation, rests with a Chief of Witness Security, appointed by the Attorney General. 65 Yet historically, only a small proportion of USMS personnel assigned to the protection of witnesses have answered to this official. 66 Most USMS agents are deputy marshals, working under a U.S. marshal whom the President appoints to a four-year term. 67 By law, U.S. marshals can supplement these deputies with untrained assistants, known as "contact deputies." U.S. marshals also have authority to veto the witness security chief's placement of a relocated witness in their district. 68 Witness oversight falters from the use of untrained staff and conflicting lines of authority. 6 9 State and Local Governments. Despite the large proportion of former criminals in the WPP, the program has never required that state or local officials be notified that witnesses are to be placed in their communities. 7 0 According to WPP policy, "necessary security precautions preclude. . . notification of local law enforcement authorities of the presence of protected witnesses within their jurisdiction...unless and until it appears that the witness has become involved in an illegal activity."' ' T Theoretically, this policy permits USMS officials to share witness information with local officials after any alleged illegal act. In practice, however, local officials are noti- 68 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 48 (statement of Gregory Baldwin). It has been observed that "the U.S. marshal often functions as an entirely separate entity responsible basically to no one." Id.
69 Even trained deputy marshals have a reputation for laxness. In the WPP's early days, one witness' identity was jeopardized when he was booked by his deputy marshal into a hotel run by the Mafia; the deputy marshal casually mentioned the witness' identity to an undercover federal agent, posing as a prostitute. Id. at 56.
70 See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 222 (letter from Assoc. Attorney General Giuliani).
Id.
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COMMENTS fled only "when a witness is arrested and his fingerprints are sent to the FBI for identification. ' 7 2 Consequently, local officials must request FBI assistance to learn about the criminal past of a suspicious person. Otherwise, federal agents are free to decide when, and if, to contact local officials about the background of a criminal suspect. 73 
Indirect Effects
To the extent that the WPP has failed to fulfill witnesses' expectations for new jobs, homes, and security, it has encouraged their discontent, and may have contributed to many witnesses' subsequent illegal acts. Employment, for example, is one means of discouraging witness crime. 74 Yet witnesses rarely get help finding work before they have completed their testimony, and many have been unemployed for years. 75 Under WPP rules, witnesses must accept available jobs or lose financial assistance from the program, regardless of their interest in the work found. 76 Additionally, in the 72 Id. The FBI provides the WPP background information on witnesses with criminal records. It also is the agency primarily responsible for divulging witness' criminal records with state officials. Justice Department regulations require all adult WPP participants to be fingerprinted upon their entry into the program. These prints are kept on file with witnesses' prior criminal histories. If a protected witness later becomes a suspect in an investigation, and fingerprints are requested from the FBI, that agency notifies the USMS, which also provides state agents with additional information relevant to their investigation. Placement in the WPP automatically insulates a witness from his or her prior responsibilities. Serious questions arise regarding the federal government's responsibility when witnesses abuse their newfound freedom by violating the law. Witnesses typically hide behind their new identities in three situations: when evading debtor responsibilities; when evading state court orders governing child custody and visitation; and when commiting violent crimes. 79 At issue in all three situations is whether the government should be made liable to third parties for its failure to foresee the effect of a witness' admission to the program, or its failure to ensure a witness' compliance with the law while in the program. In response to this question, courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to the extent of government responsibility and liability for witnesses' illegal acts.
A. CIVIL JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE WPP
Since the country's inception, America's courts have abided by the principle that a sovereign body cannot be sued without its consent.
8 0 Yet because this doctrine has little basis in the words of the 77 Commenting on informal assurances he allegedly received before entering the WPP, one witness has noted that:
I was told that my family and I would initially be placed in a hotel in the city to which we would be relocated. The stay in the hotel was to be very brief ... We stayed there for approximately two months .... Although I had been told ... my contact Marshal in my place of relocation would help me find another place to live so that we could get out of the motel, this never happened. In fact, my wife and I finally had to go out and find our own place to rent ... without any assistance from our Marshal.
Id. at 64 (testimony of Gary Haak).
78 See text accompanying infra note 237. Notwithstanding its unenforceability, the mere existence of the MOU has served to curb the promises made and expectations placed in the WPP. By the Act of February 24, 1855,83 Congress first gave courts authority to determine money damages for citizens injured by federal conduct. 8 4 This and later modifying statutes, 8 5 however, were only jurisdictional; they created neither a right to sue the United States nor a right to money damages, even for alleged constitutional violations. 8 6 Plaintiffs had to rely on a specific provision of federal law mandating compensation to receive a court judgment.
7
The absence of a provision authorizing compensation in the WPP helped defeat creditors' attempts to sue the federal government for money owed by debtors in the program. In Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 8 8 the First Circuit upheld a declaratory judgment against a creditor seeking to recover a loan made to a government witness prior to his protection. The court rejected arguments that the WPP had created a "direct and foreseeable
is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the rule ....
It is enough for us to declare its existence.").
81 The Constitution granted the federal judiciary power over all "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution the Laws of the United States, . .. [and] 93 The plaintiff in Melo-Tone did not attempt to sue the WPP for breaching its Memorandum of Understanding with the witness. That document required entering witnesses to settle debts before entering the WPP, and warned that the government could expose to creditors those witnesses failing to do so. See supra note 60. The Memorandum was neither a statute nor a formal regulation and it did not mandate compensation to creditors in the event of breach. Further, the document provided that "no agency relationship" existed between the witness and the WPP in settlement of a witness' debts. The program "assume [d] no responsibility for expenses incurred in concluding these arrangements." 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 240. Thus, breach of the MOU alone could not have been a basis for a claim in Melo-Tone.
The Memorandum of Understanding became statutorily required in 1984. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. At this time, it is unknown whether the document will eventually contain new language, and whether it will specifically mandate compensation to creditors. private individual under like circumstances" could be sued, for the negligent or wrongful acts of its employees. 9 5 Exempted from tort liability, however, were all acts of government employees exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise orperformance or the failure to exercise orperform a discretionary function or duty on a part of the federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
6
Determining the breadth of the "discretionary function exemption" is critical to courts' finding government tort liability in the WPP. Yet despite several Supreme Court cases defining the exemption, 9 7 consistent standards do not exist to distinguish discretionary acts from negligent, actionable ones. 9 8 Generally, Congress intended the FTCA to make federal actors accountable for conduct exceeding permissible limits of policy; Congress did not intend to allow citizens to use the FTCA to test the validity of policymaking itself. 9 9
The distinction between policymaking and policy implementation is often unclear, however. Government agents may act under general authority which requires them to make subjective decisions after considering unique sets of facts. These decisions may themselves be governed by informal rules, unique to an agency. Amidst uncertainty, courts have employed one of four different tests to determine the degree of discretion permitted in a given act. These can be thought of as the "absolutist," "due care," "statutory authority," and "post discretion" tests of governmental discretion. Almost without exception, the test granting government agents the greatest discretion, the "absolutist" test, has governed courts' evaluation of negligent federal conduct in the WPP. 
The "absolutist" interpretation
The Supreme Court first interpreted the reach of the discretionary function exemption in Dalehite v. United States. 10 0 Dalehite addressed the personal injury claims of several hundred people, killed or injured by an explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The explosion occurred as the fertilizer was being shipped to Europe as part of the American foreign aid program following World War II. The Court found that decisions regarding the packaging and shipment of the fertilizer were policy related. Consequently, neither the shipment's planners, nor the lower government agents who manually carried out the plans, were subject to liability.' 0 ' Federal immunity, the Court found, extended beyond an initial decision to pursue a course of action, and included all "determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans [or] specifications."'
Under an absolutist reading of Dalehite, the government should be exempt from liability for any policy decisions, and acts carrying them out, that have not been statutorily barred. As long as governmental policy is being implemented, the theory goes, a government agent cannot be subject to tort liability. Several courts addressing alleged negligence in the WPP have adopted such a view.' 0 3 Alternative interpretations of Dalehite, however, have been premised on the theory that some element of choice accompanies nearly every act.' 0 4 Courts espousing this view have addressed the reasonableness and "due care" present in a governmental action as well as its relationship to policy. 
The "due care" test
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COMMENTS of a plaintiff whose ship was damaged by the Coast Guard's failure to maintain a local lighthouse. The Coast Guard acknowledged that it had failed to implement policy; nonetheless, the agency sought to avoid tort liability on grounds that the FTCA did not reach to government acts which private individuals did not perform.' 0 6 Rejecting this argument, the Court held that the FTCA imposed a duty upon federal agencies to behave as a private person would, regardless of the uniqueness of a governmental function.' 07 The Coast Guard, like a private person, could thus be held to a standard of due care.' 0 8 Though not explicitly overruling Dalehite, Indian Towing refocuses government actors' liability upon a reasonable person standard and away from an actor's exercise of authorized discretion.
"Statutory authority" test
Functions performed under a statute or regulation expressly giving employees discretion to act generally are placed within the discretionary function exemption.' 0 9 Often, the exemption will be permitted by courts even in the absence of express statutory language. Some jurisdictions, for example, exempt government agents from FTCA liability if an agency is authorized by law to act "as [it] shall determine." 110
The "'post-discretion" test
In a final, fourth test, courts occasionally invoke FTCA liability on grounds that the negligence of federal employees has occurred after the exercise of discretionary planning."' In Logue v. United States," 1 2 for example, the decision to remove a suicidal federal prisoner from a hospital to a county jail, where he subsequently killed 106 Id. at 64. 107 The Court found that the "hornbook tort law [requires] ... one who undertakes to warn the public of danger ... to perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner, even when such an act is performed only by government officials." Id. at 64-65. 108 [Vol. 76 226
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himself, was found to be discretionary. The court found, however, that the federal agent lacked discretion with respect to guarding the prisoner; the agent's failure to provide reasonable care to prevent a second suicide attempt was held to be actionable.
13
Courts possess considerable flexibility through these four rival tests to determine the scope of the discretionary function in the WPP. Usually, however, they have chosen to adopt an absolutist reading of Dalehite, and have immunized all official acts conducted by agents in the program. 114 Courts have interpreted the WPP's sparse authorizing language to give U.S. agents broad discretion to decide not only how to protect witnesses, but also to whom protection may be offered. The negligent discretionary decisions of agents -decisions, for example, not to enforce existing custody decrees or not to warn local communities of a witness' presence -have been exempted from liability, regardless of the lack of wisdom and care with which they were made." 15 IV.
FEDERAL DISCRETION IN THE WPP
A.
WITNESSES' COMMISSION OF CRIMES
Courts' deference to governmental discretion in the face of witnesses' illegal acts is well illustrated by an Eighth Circuit decision, Bergmann v. United States. 1 6 In Bergmann, the USMS admitted Benjamin Rosado and his family into the WPP, so that Rosado might testify against underworld figures. Rosado's personal criminal record was long and well known to the assistant U.S. attorney requesting his protection. 1 7 Nonetheless, the Justice Department found that Rosado met the agency's minimal requirements for WPP admission."1 8 The USMS soon changed Rosado's name, relocated him, 1 9 and provided him with all necessary documentation; the USMS, 118 Specifically, the Department found that Rosado had agreed to be a witness, that his life appeared to be in immediate danger, and that evidence suggested it was "advantageous" to the government to protect him. Id.
119 Rosado was moved from New York City to St. Charles, Missouri. Id. at 446-47.
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COMMENTS however, neither monitored Rosado's activities in his new city, nor notified local police of his presence. Three months after his entry into the WPP, Rosado shot and killed a police officer, Fred Bergmann, while commiting a burglary. The policeman's widow brought a wrongful death action against the United States government. 120 The district court found that the USMS was negligent in its failure to protect the outside community from Rosado and imposed liability under the FTCA. The court held that the WPP's policy formulation concerning the selection and supervision of witnesses was exempt from liability.' 2 2
It imposed liability, however, for WPP agents' acts which had deviated from informal Justice Department guidelines 123 and plans.'
24
The district court also imposed liability under state tort law 25 for the government's failure to protect third persons from the potentially harmful acts of parties with whom it had a "special relationship."' 2 6 The court found that such failure was a "substantial factor" leading to Bergmann's death.'
The district court read the "discretionary function exemption" narrowly by refusing to apply it to actions inconsistent with informal 123 TheJustice Department WPP guidelines specified that "Ulob assistance, when necessary, will be provided by the Witness Security Division of the U.S. Marshals Service, but will be limited to assisting the protected person in locating one reasonable job opportunity .. " Justice Department Order OBD 2110.2, reprinted in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 284. The USMS, however, set up no job interviews for Rosado during his protection. 526 F. Supp. at 447.
124 A USMS agent testified that he intended to contact Rosado on a weekly basis, but had failed to do so. 526 F. Supp. at 448.
125 To impose liability under the FTCA, the court had to find the government liable "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1977); see supra note 94 and accompanying text. [Vol. 76 government policy. 128 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, only judged the USMS's actions according to the WPP's statutory authority and formal regulations. On this basis, it reversed the lower court.
129
The Eighth Circuit found that the WPP was required to protect only the witness, not the community. 30 Indeed, it noted, any acts that increased community security at the expense of the witness might themselves be violations of the government's discretionary function. 3 1 The court found that the USMS was not negligent to presume that Rosado would avoid committing future crimes. Rosado knew that such conduct would have terminated his protection and threatened his own life.' 3 2
The Eighth Circuit correctly extended the reach of the discretionary function exemption to include the non-disclosure of Rosado's name and location to outside parties. The WPP's longstanding policy had been to withhold witness identities to safeguard their anonymity, and to include felons in this program as long as they obeyed the law. Such a program was fully within the government's authority and discretion. At the time of his admission, nothing set Rosado apart from other felons in the WPP. Nothing indicated he was mentally unstable, or otherwise unable to abide by the standard arrangement made with other felons. It thus was neither negligent nor an abuse of discretion for USMS authorities to enroll Rosado into the WPP.
It can be argued that no such discretion should exist where evidence suggests that witnesses are unstable or that their testimony 128 The district court awarded Mrs. Bergmann $69,077.91, applying Missouri statutory law governing damages for medical treatment, funeral expenses, loss of services, and loss of companionship and consortium. Id. at 451; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon 1985) .
129 689 F.2d at 795. 130 Id. On this ground, the court dismissed the argument that the government had breached its responsibility to warn outside parties. Id. at 796 ("[I]n the absence of a statute, there is no legally enforceable duty on the part of the government to warn or compensate victims of criminal activity.") (citing Redmond v. U.S., 518 F.2d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 1975).
131 689 F.2d at 796. The court downplayed theJustice Department's guidelines requiring employment assistance. The court noted that the witness had ultimate responsibility for obtaining employment. Id. The court also disregarded attempts to correlate Rosado's unemployment and his crime, noting that Rosado had been receiving about $1,000 a month in maintenance payments from the government at the time of the Bergmann murder. 132 Id. at 797. The court established a test for determining negligence. The test examined "whether the act of placing Rosado in the program and relocating him with a new identity increased the risk that [he] would harm another person to a degree which was unreasonable." Id. The court concluded that any added freedom Rosado was given to harm an outside party was overcome by the risks he faced in doing so. Id.
will be unreliable. A second case, Taitt v. United States, 1 33 however, illustrates some courts' tendency to insulate from liability any official act performed in the WPP, regardless of its inconsistency with stated policy, or the existence of evidence of witness instability.
The Taitt case, like Bergmann, involved the murder of an outside party by a convicted felon formerly in the WPP. What distinguishes Taitt from Bergmann is evidence suggesting that the Taitt killer was emotionally unstable,1 3 4 and represented a likely threat to third persons at the time of his admission to the WPP. Yet this evidence was ignored by the USMS from the time the murderer entered the WPP until he killed his victim, Anthony Taitt.'   35 Taitt's murderer, Marion Albert Pruett, was serving a thirty year prison sentence' 36 when he agreed to testify about the slaying of his prison cellmate.1 3 7 Pruett's statements helped convict a fellow inmate, Allen Benton; 138 they also won Pruett an "unsupervised" parole after a brief hearing before the United States Parole Commission, 13 9 and led to Pruett's placement in the WPP.
Pruett and his wife, Michelle, were relocated and given new names.' 40 In August 1983, federal district courtJudge Richard Matsch dismissed a suit by Taitt's parents alleging that the government had acted negligently in admitting Pruett into the WPP. The suit also alleged that the WPP had been negligent in failing to act upon notice of the threats to Michelle's life, in failing to advise local sheriffs of Pruett's background before or after Michelle's death, and in failing to provide the parole commission with adequate information about Pruett's emotional instability, prior to his release from prison.
14 7 Matsch gave "complete discretion" to the Justice Department to decide "when, to whom, how and for how long to provide protection."'1 4 8 The judge found it "difficult to believe" that, had local officials known of Pruett's criminal and WPP record, they would have linked him to Michelle's killing. 149 Even if local officials could have drawn such a link, Matsch ruled, federal agents were entitled to FTCA immunity whenever they had to " 
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Even under its own logic, the district court opinion is flawed, for the court overlooks several readily ascertainable standards by which Marshal Chavez's acts could have been measured.
First, Pruett's Memorandum of Understanding, like that of all WPP entrants, warned that the USMS would not shield him from criminal or civil litigation "initiated prior to or subsequent to entry into the program ... "152 Local sheriffs had contacted USMS Marshal Chavez specifically in connection with an investigation that could have led to Pruett's criminal indictment. Although Chavez had no duty to report Pruett's threats to his wife while she was alive, after her murder Chavez clearly disregarded his duty to notify "local law enforcement authorities of the presence of protected witnesses [when] it appears that the witness has become involved in an illegal activity."' 153 Chavez' failure to inform local police of Pruett's background was directly responsible for his release, and indirectly enabled Pruett to continue his acts of violence. 154 Second, assuming arguendo that the USMS was justified in withholding Pruett's history while he was under protection, no justification existed for not disclosing this history once Pruett voluntarily quit the WPP and fled. Even if the WPP's authorizing statute granted the Justice Department the broadest possible discretion to protect witnesses, the department possessed no authority to grant a former witness the special privilege of keeping his status private after he abruptly left the WPP. 155 Conceivably, disclosing Pruett's identity upon his quitting the WPP would have prevented Pruett from completing his shooting spree.
Third, Pruett had a history of psychiatric disturbance, but apparently received little treatment for this illness from prison authorities or the WPP. Regardless of the truth of Pruett's recantation, it is evident that the USMS exercised minimal care in its decision to offer Pruett protection. 60 The recommendation that Pruett be admitted into the Pruett was diagnosed as needing psychiatric treatment in 1971, but never received treatment thereafter.
In its August 1985 decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that evidence showing the government had negligently administered psychological care to Pruett might serve as an independent basis for an FTCA claim. Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142, slip op. at 11 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1985). Appellants, the Taitts, were subsequently given the opportunity to obtain evidence to make such a showing. 159 Pruett testified two agencies (sic) of the FBI... came to him.., and told him that they would see to it that he go down to the Federal Witness Protection Program, if, in fact, he testified that Benton killed Zambito; the reason being, Benton was about to be released in a year to eighteen months. The government did not want him released as he was one of the largest cocaine dealers on the East Coast. Brief for Appellants at 9 n.6, Taitt v. United States, No. 83-2142 (quoting Hearing on Renewed Motion to Dismiss at 7) (statement of Appellants' Attorney AuCoin).
160 If false, Pruett's statement underscores his lack of credibility. If true, the statement may expose federal agents to civil or criminal liability for their part in obtaining knowingly perjured testimony. Under one federal statute, any person who has "procured" another to commit perjury can be found guilty of subornation of perjury, and be subject to both fines and imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1977) . See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal agents can be liable in damages for violating commands, when such violation infringes on constitutional rights); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
There is reason to believe the jury paid little attention to Pruett's original testimony
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program could have been delayed until a review of his stability and credibility was complete. The requirement for such a review was inferable from the WPP's regulatory standard that a witness be "essential . . . in a specific case that is important in the administration of criminal justice. ' 1 61 Such a review, however, was not performed on Pruett. t6 2 The district court implicitly held in Taitt that even a minimum review of a witness' veracity was not required prior to admission. This holding gave WPP administrators free reign to select entrants without justification or accountability. Only the most absolutist reading of the reach of the FTCA's discretionary function exemption -one that extends government agents' discretion to include any acts not specifically barred by statute or formal regulation16 3 -could justify such an extreme result. 164
B.
WITNESSES' VIOLATION OF CUSTODY/VISITATION ORDERS
When the WPP separates children from a noncustodial parent, the government's interest in suppressing organized crime is pitted against a parent's competing claim to the children. Courts have recognized that noncustodial parents possess some constitutional right to their children.' 6 5 Yet the Supreme Court has never clarified the against Benton, and may have suspected Pruett's personal role in the slaying. Benton was convicted not of murder, the charge Pruett testified about, but of conspiracy to murder. See Benton, 637 F.2d at 1052.
161 See U.S. AirORNEYS' MANUAL 9-9-2100 in 1982 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 259; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text;.
162 See supra notes 135 and accompanying text. 163 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. 164 While deputy marshal Chavez should have been found liable for his negligence, the decision of the Parole Commission to release Pruett to the WPP was not actionable even though the the board may have had incomplete information on his history. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188 (1979) ("the decision as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be released [from prison] has been committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole Commission."). Even if the Parole Commission failed to request Pruett's medical records at the time of its hearing, it relied in good faith on the USMS providing it with an adequate record, and had authority to act as it did. If, however, the Commission requested but never received medical records from the USMS, the USMS could be found liable for a negligent act under the FTCA. See supra note 156. 165 The Constitution does not mention specifically the appropriate degree of protection to which the relationship between a parent and child is entitled. 
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protection to which noncustodial parents are entitled. In early cases involving administration of the WPP, courts gave non-custodial parents little protection against the threat that their children would be relocated without notice; the relocation was justified as long as it was rationally related to the WPP's administration, and the wishes of the protected, custodial parent.' 66 More recently, courts have asseited a stronger constitutional interest on behalf of the noncustodial parent, one requiring the showing of a compelling governmental interest.' 6 7
The status of parents' custodial relationship with their children similarly has affected their ability to sue the government under the FTCA for acts damaging their parent-child relationship. Early cases found that the WPP had unlimited discretion to remove children from noncustodians in accordance with the custodian's wishes. The mere existence of a biological relationship between parent and child does not trigger a protected parental interest. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843. The Supreme Court has suggested that such an interest grows along with the parent's responsibility and support for the child. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (unwed father deserved less due process protection when no custodial, personal, or financial relationship was created); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (state may deprive a putative father of authority to approve child's adoption without violating Due Process Clause, when father has not lived with child but adopting parent has).
Once a parent has established a relationship with a child, a constitutional protection exists that is stronger than that for parents never acquiring such a relationship. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), for example, the Court found that the state could remove a child from parental care in response to charges of parental neglect only with clear and convincing evidence that such neglect existed. Id. at 769. If a "clear and convincing evidence" test is appropriate for the removal of children from unfit parents, it is logical to apply an equally stringent standard when state actions separate children from fit parents. This is the situation in most of the cases involving parent-child separation in the WPP. 
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COMMENTS she had been deprived of a liberty interest without a hearing. 1 1 5 Despite evidence that the woman had cared little for her son prior to his departure, 1 6 the district court ruled that the Constitution required notice prior to the termination of any parental access to a child.' 8 7
The district court in Ruffalo also found that in some situations, actions by WPP agents denying a parent's constitutional right will serve as the basis for a separate FTCA claim. 188 The government had claimed that the FTCA discretionary function exemption insulated it from any tort liability arising from the deprivation of Mrs. Ruffalo's visitation rights. 1 8 9 The court found that Congress had the power to authorize the WPP so as to immunize it from tort liability stemming from the termination of parental rights. Hall, Director of the USMS, testified that "I don't think that we would ever want to be in a posture of telling one parent: 'We have relocated your children; you are out of luck forever.' ").
191 See Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 710-11. 192 An assistant chief for planning and evaluation of the USMS witness security division revealed at trial that the USMS, as a rule, had not required contact between children in the program and parents outside the program. Id. at 709. Noting that visitation rights "almost universal(ly)" were mandated by state law, the court found that the WPP's admission procedures, defacto, "had the effect of destroying a pre-existing legal right." Id.
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WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 239 FTCA,' 9 3 the court held. By insisting that the WPP be administered pursuant to specific authority, the court in Ruffalo adopted a nonabsolutist interpretation of the discretionary function exemption. A third case has challenged the notion that the WPP's original authorization barred a federal preemption of state custody orders. In Franz v. United States,' 9 4 the District of Columbia Circuit found that in creating the WPP, Congress intended "the Attorney General to act, on occasion, in a manner that might be at odds with visitation rights. . . . Its implementation of the Witness Protection Program might adversely affect the rights of third parties (such as creditors and noncustodial parents)."' 9 5 The District of Columbia Circuit, unlike the Eighth Circuit, found that WPP policy permitted maximum USMS discretion regarding the relocation of children in the program.' 9 6 The Circuit Court's decision prompted the district court, on remand, to bar Franz" 9 7 FTCA suit for tortious interference with visitation rights.' 9 8 196 Judge Bork filed a separate opinion in Franz questioning the majority assumption that Congress intended for the WPP to override state custody or visitation orders. Domestic relations, Bork stated, had "long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States." Id. at 1435 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)) (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Bork noted that federal legislation could oust state law where evidence of congressional intent was explicit, or implicit. The evidence of intent could be found in pervasive federal regulations in the area, dominance of the federal interest, or the inconsistency of state and federal law. Id. Bork voted to remand Franz, in part, to determine fully the extent of Congress' delegation in the WPP. 197 In his addendum statement in the Court of Appeals opinion, Judge Bork expressed a preference for imposing FTCA liability upon a showing that the law of the state where the alleged violations occurred, Pennsylvania, recognized a tort of interference with visitation rights. 712 F.2d at 1435 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
198 "Given the broad range of the duties involved in the administration of the Pro-While it precludes suits by non-custodians under the FTCA, Franz increases the amount of due process protection available to such a parent. The D.C. Circuit took the position, previously expressed in Ruffalo,' 9 9 that notice was required prior to the termination of any parent's access to a child. 200 In addition, the court asserted that a parent's right to a child could not be deprived merely by the government's assertion of its need to protect a witness and the child. Rather, the government had to make a "particularized showing" at the time of protection that "the governmental interest would be promoted in ways sufficiently substantial to warrant overriding basic human liberties." 20 1 Franz eventually was returned to the district court for consideration of such a showing. have less discretionary authority to deviate from the terms of the MOU once protection begins. The MOU's codification may provide more success to plaintiffs using the Federal Tort Claims Act to sue the government for WPP negligence which contributes to witnesses' illegal acts.
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE WITNESS SECURITY REFORM ACT
The Witness Security Reform Act's most significant improvement to the administration of the WPP comes through its required pre-screening of prospective witnesses. By stipulating that the government assess both the need for a witness' testimony and the risks of offering protection, the new law ensures an improved process for selecting both witnesses and cases for which protection will be offered. One consequence of this pre-screening requirement may be an end to cases like Leonhard. No longer will WPP administrators have the freedom to assert the privacy of organized crime fighting at the expense of a family's constitutional right to companionship; some accommodation of this right will have to be settled in advance of protection. Another notable achievement of the new law is its Victim's Compensation Fund. The fund is not an admission of federal culpability for witnesses' unauthorized acts, but it does recognize the governmental role as an accessory to such acts. 24 1 At least four issues remain unresolved in the wake of the enactment of the "Witness Security Reform Act," however. All concern questions central to the administration of the WPP, and warrant prompt consideration by the program's officials.
First, while the Act asserts the need to preserve family bondsand prohibits witness protection from commencing when these bonds are jeopardized 24 2 -it provides no mechanism for the airing of child custody grievances once protection has begun. Under the law, federal district courts are charged with creating a procedure allowing protected witnesses to mediate child custody grievances 
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with non-protected ex-spouses. This procedure is intended to ensure communication between the parties, without exposing a protected witness' location or identity. Courts have already questioned the feasibility of structuring custodial hearings without damaging witness anonymity, however. 2 4 3 It shall be difficult for any custodial hearing or arrangement to be devised which will not expose a witness' identity at some point in the course of protection.
44
Second, the new law creates ambiguity in the power given to state and local governments to obtain witness information. The Attorney General is newly authorized to disclose a witness' identity to local officials, after weighing the value and risk of such disclosure. 24 5 However, state and local officials lack authority to compel disclosure of witness information, except in connection with specific investigations or pursuant to court order. 2 4 6 Non-federal officials thus have an opportunity under the new law to receive witness information even if a witness is not implicated in an offense under state or local investigation; they merely need to persuade federal authorities or the courts of the value of their receiving such information. State or local officials can be expected to devote increasing efforts towards making such a showing.
47
Third, it is unclear whether the WPP will become a common vehicle for obtaining testimony in cases not involving organized crime. Congressional drafters of the Witness Security Reform Act 243 See, e.g., Franz, 712 F.2d at 1440 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (critique by Judge Bork of the practicability of a hearing which can balance a parent's constitutional right to a child with the government's need for witness testimony).
244 Even if the mediation and arbitration authorized by the new law are conducted without exposing a witness' identity, see supra note 229, the WPP must also address the likelihood that children will readily share a witness' new identity and location with their non-protected parent.
245 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 246 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 247 State and local officials may have had an easier time persuading the Justice Department of the need to share witness information prior to passage of the Witness Security Reform Act. Because the WPP contained so few guidelines and requirements concerning the admission of new witnesses, local officials had justification in questioning the harmlessness of witnesses placed in their communities. However, the new law's requirement that a full assessment of a witness' safety risk precede WPP admission may diminish the need to exchange witness information. This is because under the new law, a witness' potential for harm presumably is calculated by the federal government prior to admission. A witness who passes such federal scrutiny arguably is entitled to the same privacy from local exposure that ordinary citizens enjoy.
At the same time, the new law does not forbid the admission of witnesses who pose a threat to a community. It only requires that the value of witness testimony outweigh the threat to a community. Thus, dangerous persons may still enter the WPP without local officials' knowledge. Consequently, state and local officials are still justified in seeking the information needed to prevent such a possibility.
1985]
COMMENTS noted that a witness may be threatened by organized and nonorganized criminals alike. 248 Temporary relocation, or relocation without a change of name, might be plausible ways to elicit testimony in several types of non-organized crimes, such as blackmail or rape. 249 It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the promise of relocation will prompt targets of these offenses to testify. It is equally unclear whether the WPP can satisfactorily meet its original purpose, the protection of witnesses in organized criminal cases, as long as it accepts this new one.
Finally, while federal liability for witness' illegal acts remains expressly limited by the new law, 2 50 the WPP now has statutorily prescribed standards against which its agents' job performance can be measured. Courts previously have chosen to exempt WPP agents from FTCA liability because of the lack of such "ascertainable standards." '25 ' Now, when a WPP agent fails to complete a psychological evaluation of a witness, or admits a witness without preparation of the Memorandum of Understanding, the barrier to FTCA liability is removed.
252
Exposing all admission decisions to FTCA liability, of course, could have a chilling effect on federal agents' use of the WPP. For example, the Justice Department could discontinue the enrollment of custodial parents into the WPP, if it feared that non-custodians would use the FTCA to challenge allegedly negligent decisions affecting existing domestic relations. Whether a particular witness relocation alters or destroys a familial bond is a judgment call. In part, success in the WPP depends upon program administrators' ability to exercise appropriate discretion to make such a call.
Thus, while there remains a need to expose federal agents in 248 [T]here is no reason to deny protection to a witness who is in danger of retaliation, simply because the nexus between the offense and organized criminal activity is lacking. For instance, a rape victim fearing retaliation from her assailant may not be willing to testify unless relocation or protection is made available. That a further assault will subject the attacker to further prosecution is cold comfort in such a situation. Protection or relocation should be available ... 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3547. 249 Heretofore, the Justice Department rarely has relocated a witness without providing new identification. Temporary relocation without a name change, however, might become common practice in rape cases, where an assailant's resources and interests in pursuing a victim out of town are likely to be less than those of a member of organized crime.
250 See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. The new law's $50,000 ceiling on payments to families of victims falls far short of adequate compensation for many victims of crime.
251 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 252 Even under an absolutist interpretation of the federal discretionary function, these would constitute acts contravening explicit statutory requirements.
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the WPP to FTCA liability, Congress should adopt a standard which preserves governmental tort immunity for conduct arising from federal agents' ordinary negligence. Specifically, Congress should amend the WPP's authorization so that federal agents are exposed to liability for conduct stemming from their gross negligence. A "gross negligence" liability standard was proposed for the WPP in Congress in 1982.253 It would expose federal agents to liability only when their acts signified indifference to their legal duty, and disregard for their legal obligations to third persons. 2 54 Such a standard would obligate WPP administrators to perform the substantial witness evaluations now required by statute, even as it reserved them wide discretion to make admission and protection decisions in light of these evaluations. At the same time, a "gross negligence" standard would hold WPP officials responsible for flagrant derelictions in their now dual duties: consideration of the security interests of third persons alongside the national interest in challenging organized crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its creation in 1970, the Witness Protection Program has had an undeniable, positive impact on federal efforts to expose and eliminate organized crime. Sadly, however, innocent persons have had to pay a heavy price for the program's accomplishments. Relocated witnesses, acting under the protection of new identities provided at government expense, have been able to hide their children from former spouses in violation of standing child custody decrees. Witnesses have abrogated their protection arrangements prior to their own commission of violent crimes. Such illegal acts were natural by-products of the WPP's poorly-conceived authorizing legislation. Title V of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act focused almost exclusively on protecting witnesses from the wrath of organized criminals. The legislation largely ignored society's need to be protected from the wrath of the witnesses themselves.
In the wake of Congress' 1984 reform of the WPP, there is rea- 
